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THE COMING JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
INFORMATION AGE:
EXAMINATIONS OF THREE PAST SOCIO-
ECONOMIC AGES SUGGEST THE FUTURE
This Comment looks to the past and future and attempts to
speculate upon the likely course of jurisprudential evolution. It
notes that humankind has recently moved from one great socio-
economic epoch, the Industrial Age, into a new Information Age.
Yet there has not been a corresponding jurisprudential shift which
would reflect the socio-economic changes. This "time-lag" phe-
nomenon is consistent with past jurisprudential shifts which fol-
lowed the changes from past socio-economic eras. The Comment
examines the jurisprudential evolutions inspired by the Feudal
Age (property law), the Commercial Age (contract law, and the
Industrial Age (labor relations law). The Comment then specu-
lates on the probable evolution the shift to the Information Age
will inspire.
INTRODUCTION
Cable television operators complain publicly that people, who oth-
erwise would not steal or shoplift, apparently are not troubled when
taking cable signals.1 CBS threatens legal action against NBC be-
cause the latter allegedly "stole" news footage from a shared satel-
lite.2 Elizabeth Taylor sues ABC network3 to enjoin the creation and
broadcast of a video biography of her life. And so it goes.
It is the early 1980's and mankind, particularly the western indus-
trial world, has entered a new socio-economic "age." This new age
has been variously labeled the post-industrial society,4 the "Third
1. San Diego Union, Nov. 11, 1983, at E5, col. 1 (quoting Ed Dooley of the Na-
tional Cable Television Association).
2. The problem occurred twice within two weeks in 1983 concerning news footage
being fed out of Lebanon. The first such incident occurred Oct. 24 involving footage of
the terrorist attack on the U.S. Marine compound in Beirut. The second occurred Nov. 4
involving a similar attack against Israeli soldiers in Tyre. NBC formally apologized.
USA Today, Nov. 8, 1983, at D-2, col. 3.
3. Miss Taylor sued the potential program's producer as well as the network. Tay-
lor v. American Broadcasting Co., No. 82 Civ. 6977 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 1982).
4. The creation of the descriptive phrase is most commonly associated with
Harvard sociologist Daniel Bell. See, e.g., D. BELL, THE COMING OF THE POST-INDUS-
TRIAL SOCIETY (1973).
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Wave" 5 or the Information Age.6 Each label implies a somewhat dif-
ferent approach to and description of that which all acknowledge is
the same phenomenon. They describe a society in which the basis of
wealth, or the "strategic resource,"' 7 is not land (as in the Feudal
Age), or goods for trade (as in the Commercial Age) or manufactur-
ing and laboring capacity (as in the Industrial Age) but is
information.
Each of those earlier socio-economic ages had a substantial effect
on the formulation of the common law. Many property law concepts
were created during the Feudal Age. Contract law emerged from the
Commercial Age. Much, if not most, of the modern evolution of the
law arose from concerns about the changes to an industrial society,
including (but not exclusively) the areas of product liability, labor
relations, and negligence by agency.
It would follow that the emergence of the Information Age would
likely create changes in the law at least as profound as those of pre-
vious socio-economic ages. These changes are apt to create a system
of legal entitlements to the age's central resource similarly as entitle-
ments were created relative to the central resources of the past ages.
But changes in the law occur slowly. The evolution of feudal prop-
erty law, that age's system of entitlements, took centuries and was
not a complex, integrated system until late in the feudal period.8 The
evolution of contract law, a system of recognition of commercial en-
titlements and expectations, took more than a century.9 And most of
the doctrinal concepts arising out of the Industrial Age took decades
to formulate and disseminate among jurisdictions.10
As socio-economic change has accelerated and communications
have improved, the time required for legal change and evolution has
shortened as well. However, due to its tradition-bound nature and its
precedential approach, the judiciary has often trailed the general
5. A. TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE (1980).
6. See, e.g., J. NAISBITr, MEGATRENDS 11-38 (1982).
7. Id. at 15.
8. J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 27 (2d ed. 1975).
9. See generally M. RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY
451-60 (1936) (discussing the evolution of contract law).
10. Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) with West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (Employee relations-the Court reversed completely
the view concerning whether states could interfere in employment contracts. The reversal
took 32 years.). And compare Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842) with
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (Ct. App. 1916) with
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462-63, 150 P.2d 436,
(1944) 444-45 (Traynor concurring) with Greeman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59
Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (Products liability-gradual change
in the law from the view that only those in privity of contract could sue for compensation
due to harm caused by defective product, to allowing a cause of action if product was
negligently built, to the suggestion that there should be strict liability for defective prod-
ucts, to the adoption of strict liability. The process took 121 years.)
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public and the legislature in adapting new socio-economic values.,,
This tendency was true in the distant and the recent past. More re-
cently, commentators 12 have observed that contemporary societal
change is greatly accelerating. 3 Futurist Alvin Toffier observes in
his book The Third Wave,
The First Wave of change-the agricultural revolution-took thousands of
years to play itself out. The Second Wave-the rise of industrial civiliza-
tion-took a mere three hundred years. Today history is even more acceler-
ative, and it is likely that the Third Wave 4 will sweep across history and
complete itself in a few decades. We, who happen to share the planet at this
explosive moment, will therefore feel the full impact of the Third Wave in
our lifetimes. 5
If such assertions of accelerating social change are true, then the
inherent judicial tendency to follow the past would obviously become
more problematical.
The gravity of social change is only perceivable if considered as a
whole, rather than as isolated incidents and problems. For example,
in 1982, more than 60 percent of American jobs were information-
handling jobs compared to only 13 percent manufacturing jobs.,,
Yet no major legal doctrines have developed to reflect the significant
societal changes represented by the shift to an information base.
Further, existing doctrine has been applied perfunctorily, blithely,
and with no apparent consciousness that such a changed socio-eco-
11. For example, during the New Deal era, the general population, victims of the
Great Depression, changed their socio-economic attitudes first as manifested in the
wholesale liberal Democrat shift for the 1932 election. Thereafter, those shifts of atti-
tudes were reflected in legislation of the New Deal. It was not however, until the late
1930's that the judiciary, as symbolized by the Supreme Court, changed its perspective.
Compare generally Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) with a case 5 years
later, United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). See also G. GUNTHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 150-52 (1980) (discussing Roosevelt's "court-
packing" plan, a reaction to Supreme Court intransigence).
12. See, e.g., A. TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK (1970).
13. Id. at 19-35.
14. The reader is reminded that "the Third Wave" is Toffier's term for the present
era (see supra note 5 and accompanying text). Toffier acknowledges the Information Age
as an alternative description but goes on to assert that he prefers his term, "the Third
Wave," as it is more inclusive. A. TOFFLER, supra note 5, at 9. This Comment will use
Information Age as its focus is on the more narrow question of the legal handling of
information.
15. Id. at 10.
16. J. NAISBIr, MEGATRENDS 14 (1982). Naisbitt remarks that in determining
the beginning of the Information Age, the year 1956 (more than a quarter-century ago)
is looked to as an important demarcation point. It is the first year wherein white-collar
workers, people in technical, managerial and clerical positions (many in information-han-
dling positions), outnumbered blue-collar workers (manual laborers and industrial work-
ers). Id. at 12.
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nomic base should create jurisprudential changes.1
As discussed earlier, in an information society the control and ma-
nipulation of information is an important-the most impor-
tant-basis of wealth. Information, unlike land and machines, is
most often ephemeral, intangible and intellectual. Understandably,
such interests may be undervalued by a legal system more familiar
with handling tangible property. Inevitably however, the legal system
will eventually create legal mechanisms and doctrines that underlie a
system of entitlements to this new central resource. An elemental
thesis of this Comment is that such legal system undervaluing of a
central resource often occurs near the beginning of a new socio-eco-
nomic age. An examination of the past will show that legal theory
eventually "catches up" with social reality. But there is a time gap.
However, this historical pattern of jurisprudential catching up is ob-
viously more troublesome during the contemporary era of constantly
accelerating social change than in the more socially static past.
The legal system will inevitably reform to more strongly value in-
formational interests and to thereby create systems of entitlements
surrounding those interests. That reform process will be assisted and
accelerated if legal theoreticians and practitioners begin to perceive
information interests as a unity.
This Comment intends to assist in that process of conceptual unifi-
cation. Conceptual unification will be aided in several ways. First,
unity with similar points in history. This Comment will briefly ex-
amine the three previous broad socio-economic eras: the Feudal Age,
the Commercial Age, and the Industrial Age, and how the legal sys-
tem eventually created a system of entitlements around each age's
central resource. Secondly, unity with past conceptual unification ef-
forts. The Comment will examine a similar effort to urge holistic
perception of entitlements where previously the entitlements had
been perceived as separate: the "new property" concept of various
governmental entitlements. Thirdly, the Comment will examine ele-
ments of the Information Age and how the legal system has shifted
to adapt to it18 and the legal conflicts its very nature must generate.
Lastly, the Comment will speculate about possible jurisprudential
17. As examples of summary dismissals of Information Age causes of action see
Data Cash System, Inc. v. J.S. & A. Group Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979),
aff'd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980) (ruling that computer object codes
are "mechanical device[s]" and not "expressions of ideas" and hence a suit based on
their copyrightability should be dismissed summarily) and Frosch v. Grossett & Dunlap,
4 Media L. Rep. 2307 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (suit by heirs of famous actress Marilyn
Monroe to control and be compensated for an unauthorized biography was summarily
dismissed).
18. This Comment will concentrate on the right of publicity as an example of the
legal system recently recognizing an entitlement to informational interests. It will illus-
trate how the right, in consistently being construed narrowly, is an example of.the under-
valuing of informational interests.
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shifts the Information Age may inspire and how one element of the
system of entitlements it has already inspired (compulsory licensing
under the Copyright Act of 197619), may serve as a model for ame-
liorating otherwise inescapable doctrinal conflict.
BASIS OF A SOCIETY'S WEALTH HISTORICALLY PROTECTED AND
REFLECTED By ITS LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS
As asserted in the introduction, whenever the major basis of socie-
tal wealth changes, society eventually creates legal doctrines and
mechanisms providing entitlements that recognize and protect
wealth. A brief review20 of how this process has worked in other
socio-economic eras will assist a prediction of how the current transi-
tion to an information-based society is apt to change the jurispru-
dence. The Comment will review the Feudal Age, the Commercial
Age and the Industrial Age.
The Feudal Age: Land-based Economy and Real Property-
dominated Jurisprudence
Feudal society should be recognized as the final portion of a
broader socio-economic epoch-the agricultural revolution.2 1 Ap-
proximately ten millenia ago, man first began to settle more perma-
nently and cultivate crops; hunters and gatherers became farmers.2
Thus land became the primary measure of wealth and the most
"strategic resource" 23 in the agriculturally based society.
The most complex system of social and legal regulation arising
from an agricultural society was the feudal system.24 Virtually all
19. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. V 1981). The sections of the statute describing
the system of compulsory licensing are sections 111 and 115.
20. The focus of this Comment will be present and future jurisprudence. Past
socio-economic eras have been reviewed merely to deduce patterns of social and legal
changes which can, presumably, be applied to the present and the future. This Comment
does not, therefore, given its purpose, purport to include a detailed or extensive review of
the feudal, commercial or industrial eras. Those eras have been written about extensively
elsewhere.
21. The agricultural revolution began approximately ten thousand years ago and is
considered as lasting until the beginning of the Industrial Revolution (mid-eighteenth or
early-nineteenth centuries). See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
22. Ironically, this primitive period of man's existence, the period of the hunter
and gatherer, was by a wide margin the longest. It lasted, by some estimates, one million
years. The approximately ten thousand years since the beginning of agriculture is much
shorter. See, e.g., S. CLOUGH & R. RAPP, EUROPEAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 16-17 (3d ed.
1975).
23. J. NAISBITT, supra note 16, at 15.
24. The classical civil law system of Greece and Rome and other early systems
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legal commentators trace the origins of the Anglo-American com-
mon law to this feudal period.2 5
As with all socio-economic ages, the personal needs to be satisfied
by the Feudal Age were created by the previous age.26 Feudalism
was designed to provide all parties mutual security which was neces-
sitated by the chaos of the Dark Ages.27 During the Dark Ages, land
was the resource that allowed people to acquire the minimum essen-
tials of life. European society28 evolved into a complex organization
intended to provide both mutual physical protection and cultivation
of crops-feudalism.
One man, the vassal, commends himself to another man, whom he chooses
as his master and who accepts this deliberate "commendation." The vassal
owes his master fealty, counsel, military and material assistance. The
master-the lord--owes his vassal fealty, protection and the means of sub-
sistence. This last can be provided in various ways, usually by conceding to
the vassal a piece of land known as a "benefice" or "fief." Thus the hierar-
chy among individuals was very soon accompanied by a hierarchy of rights
over land, due to an "extreme parcelling out of property rights. '29
The crops raised on the land were shared, in stipulated amounts,
between master and vassal.30 Both parties to the feudal bond had
such as the Babylonian code of Hammurabi were at times complex, but far less obviously
centered around real property as medieval feudalism. See generally G. ARCHER, His-
TORY OF THE LAW 19-69 (1928).
25. John Stuart Mill, as one example, asserted, "The basis of English Law was,
and still is, the feudal system." Quoted in J. DILLON, THE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 302 (1894).
26. This tendency for one age to lay the groundwork for the next is observable
throughout history. The chaos of the Dark Ages created the need for security which was
a major inspiration of the interlocking relationships that formed the basis of feudalism;
late feudalism's collection of people in cities and creation of strong monarchies provided
the finances, communications and safety necessary for the trade of the Mercantile Age
and financed the Industrial Revolution; and the giant corporations created by the indus-
trial society created the financial resources required for research and development and
the vast need for communications over long distances and for data storage and retrieval
which inspired the Information Age.
27. The period from the final collapse of the Roman Empire in Europe to approxi-
mately the tenth century was a period of almost unimaginable social disorganization.
During the Dark Ages, the world suffered fundamental disintegration of an ordered
society.
Even the habit of, or feeling for, a stable society gradually disappeared. It became
once again, as in the dawn of history, a world of disorganized individuals who looked to
their own might for the minimum essentials of life. J. CRIBBET, supra note 8, at 27.
28. For a description focusing more on the French and German feudal experience
see G. FOURQUIN, LORDSHIP AND FEUDALISM IN THE MIDDLE AGES (1976).
29. Id. at 11.
30. In early feudal times, stress apparently was laid on the sharing of the crops,
which the low-status vassal, serf or tiller of the soil, had allocated to him. G. ARCHER,
HISTORY OF THE LAW 82-83 (1928). As time went by, greater stress was applied, accord-
ing to custom, on the serf to pledge agricultural service (as well as potential military
service) in the fields of the manor the lord had set aside for his own sustenance (the
demesne). Often a serf would work half of the six-day work week for the manor. Even
then at least a token of the output of the serf's land was still due to the lord as part of
the feudal agreement. S. CLOUGH & R. RAPP, supra note 22, at 49-50.
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pledged to militarily assist the other. Land was the basis of these
interlocking relationships."a An increasingly formal jurisprudential
system was created which recognized these relationships through
rights and claims appurtenant to the society's essential
resource-land.32
Although William the Conqueror and his immediate Norman suc-
cessors created the general framework of feudal administration,
33
later generations of kings, barons, churchmen and judges3 4 created
the complexity of land-related jurisprudence. In fact, Professor Crib-
bet has asserted, "[O]ur law of property was born in feudalism and
came to maturity as feudalism was dying. ' 35 The eventual system
forms much of modern real property law, both in its theory and its
terminology.386
The feudal system recognized relative real property rights and al-
lowed participants to convert access to the primary resource (land)
into means of satisfying fundamental needs, i.e., food (sharing of
crops and livestock between master and vassal), labor (pledges of the
vassal to work for the master part of the time), and physical protec-
tion (mutual pledges of military support).
The examination of feudal life thus far provides a model for legal
system evolution. The model demonstrates how a socio-economic sys-
tem may depend upon a central resource,37 inspiring an administra-
tive/jurisprudential system which defines and protects the relative
accesses which individuals have to that resource. Further, the legal/
administrative system provides a means by which an individual's ac-
31. See generally, e.g., M. RADIN, supra note 9, at 120-23.
32. It is generally conceded that "[E]nglish land law begins, for all practical pur-
poses, with 1066 and the Battle of Hastings." J. CRIBBET, supra note 8, at 29.
33. Further, the early Normans set the basic structure of British feudalism. Wil-
liam the Conqueror's Domesday Book, his registry of landholdings, was "the most
searching and valuable survey ever made of a nation in medieval times." G. ARCHER,
HISTORY OF THE LAW 154 (1928).
Archer further asserted that the early Norman action marked British feudalism as
unique because clearly all land was held of the King and no land stood outside of this
central relation. Id. at 155.
34. M. RADIN, supra note 9, at 88-101.
35. J. CRIBBET, supra note 8, at 27 (emphasis added).
36. For example, "The land which the vassal now held was called his 'fief' and has
become the 'fee' of our modern law." Id. at 28.
37. Archer uses the term "productive agency" similarly as Naisbitt uses "strategic
resource." J. NAISBITT, supra note 16, at 15. This Comment uses "central resource," as
the fundamental resource around which the period's socio-economic system is con-
structed. Archer wrote, for example, "The Feudal System, as we have seen, was based
entirely upon the idea of agricultural labor as the productive agency of society." G.
ARCHER, supra note 33, at 90.
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cess to the primary resource can be converted to meet the individ-
ual's fundamental needs.
The Commercial Age: Multi-faceted Changes in the Common Law
Support Trade
The end of the fifteenth century and beginning of the sixteenth
century is generally viewed as the end of feudalism38 and the begin-
ning of modern times.39
During this time of transition, cities began to grow around sea-
ports and sometimes around the courts of the great kings.40 Whereas
the model for feudal life was the self-sufficient manor,41 in cities,
guilds, built by men who shared a craft or occupation, created clas-
ses of people whose livelihoods were based on specialization and
trading for other products. A small class of merchants and traders
arose to serve the needs of the urban specialists. 2 The use of money
became popular.43 The cities began to ship goods for trade, thus fos-
tering the creation of a specialist group of sailors.4 4 Self-sufficiency
38. Whenever one is examining broad socio-economic movements across centuries
it is, of course, impossible to fix exact beginning and ending dates for the eras. Further
these broad eras overlap and elements of the previous eras survive into more recent ones.
39. Economic historians Clough and Rapp observed:
Although Europeans who awoke on the morning of January 1, 1500, certainly
noticed no great difference from December 31, 1499, and were totally unaware
of arising in a new historical era, changes took place in the course of European
history within the designated time span which were important enough to justify
historians in their seemingly arbitrary periodization. These changes were 1) the
development of humanism, 2) the growth of science as a method of attaining
knowledge, 3) the Protestant Revolt, 4) forward steps in the rise of national
states and of nationalism, 5) geographical discovering overseas, 6) the beginning
of the economic exploitation by Europe of newly found lands, and 7) concomi-
tantly in staples which was crucial in Western culture's attaining a position of
economic hegemony in the world. Each of these changes had an effect on eco-
nomic growth in Western culture ...
S. CLOUGH & R. RAPP, supra note 22. This Comment will concentrate on considerations
of points four through seven, particularly six and seven.
40. This solidification around great monarchs along with the subinfeudation of
nobles representing territories having a common culture and language caused people,
during the late feudal period, to conceive of themselves as living within nations. Subin-
feudation, coincidentally, was the method of creating the feudal hierarchy. A chain was
created beginning with the king on top and working down to the actual serf who physi-
cally worked the land.
Cribbet has published a model for the subinfeudation structure: King Tenant-in-chief
(in capite), Mense Lords (both lord and vassal), and Tenant in demesne (the vassal in
actual possession of the land). J. CRIBBET, supra note 8, at 28.
41. All goods and services necessary for the sustaining of life, from the lord's lifes-
tyle down to the most common serf, were supposed to be created within the manor by its
inhabitants. Trade was unnecessary in such a situation and the use of money was rare.
For a description of the structure of the great manors, see S. CLOUGH & R. RAPP, supra
note 22, at 46-50.
42. Y. BRENNER, LOOKING INTO THE SEEDS OF TIME 84-86 (1979).
43. S. CLOUGH & R. RAPP, supra note 22, at 97-106.
44. Id. at 76, 121-24. The variety and importance of the overseas exploration is
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was no longer the goal of the city dweller/specialist. Urban social/
commercial interactions were the fertile ground for potential changes
in the law. The rapidity of the trade expansion was phenomenal.
Leading economic historians estimate that the totality of European
trade more than doubled in the first century of the Commercial
Age.45
Commerce soon became the center around which countries or-
dered their affairs and the factor which determined their status and
power .4  European states, consistent with the prevalent economic
philosophy of mercantilism, regulated economies hoping to inspire
more trade and economic growth.
The government regulation of the countries' economies eventually
pervaded virtually every element of those countries' economic lives.4
As with most forms of government regulation, the mercantilist eco-
nomic regulation assisted some groups operating in those economies
and injured others.
Amongst those new interest groups whose affairs were injured by
mercantilist rules "were private entrepreneurs, whose collective
power was increasing over this time. As time went by, the vast trad-
ing expeditions became more often financed by large trading compa-
nies which sold shares in the enterprise"48 rather than by the crown.
The Commercial Age inspired multitudinous and varied49 changes
well known. In the decades immediately after Columbus' 1492 voyage, there rapidly fol-
lowed other explorations too numerous to be listed in their entirety. Within 30 years,
these major explorations followed: DeGama had sailed from Europe around Africa to
India and back; Cabral had discovered South America; Amerigo Vespucci, on a trip to
Brazil, successfully concluded that the crew was not in the Far East, but a new world;
and Magellan's crew had circumnavigated the globe. (Magellan himself was killed dur-
ing the voyage in the Philippines. Magellan, though Portuguese, settled for the Spanish
Crown and had claimed the islands for Spain before his death.)
45. S. CLOUGH & R. RAPP, supra note 22, at 147. For example, in 30 years, 1588-
1618, the total size of the British merchant marine doubled. At the height of Portugal's
expansion in the 1540's, Lisbon "literally choked with ships" and Antwerp's port had five
hundred ships a day pass through it.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 204.
48. The trading companies were thus the original source of the modem corporate
form and thereby of corporation law. The companies typically limited liability, in case of
loss, to that which the shareholders had invested in the enterprise, a fundamental ele-
ment of the corporate form.
Further, the trading companies were the first wide-spread users of insur-
ance-insurance against loss at sea. Records of the English 'East India Company, for
example, suggested that about one out of four ships were lost during the early period of
wide-spread trade.
49. Besides the origins of corporation and insurance law discussed, supra note 48,
this period saw a growth of codification of statutes; the more frequent publishing of judi-
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in the common law, particularly the emergence of contract law.
Agreements related to trade, other than the basic feudal land-related
pledges, 50 had not been viewed with great importance by medieval
society. 51 So undervalued were trade agreements that, in his contem-
porary treatise, Glanvil wrote "royal courts could not be troubled
with a breach of 'private convention.' "52 Traders themselves were
similarly held in low esteem by feudal society.53
Examples of restrictions with which medieval policy surrounded
merchant's activities included those restrictions in acts, such as the
Statute of Laborers (1349)," which ordered able-bodied persons to
work at reasonable rates and forbade the refusal of service to anyone
wishing it.55
cial opinions, the rise of personal liability concepts and a distillation of tort law generally,
a change in real property concepts (from a view of absolute owner control to a social
utilitarian criterion) and a growing sophistication of partnership law.
50. In the two centuries that followed the Norman Conquest, land was the
basis of social organization, government and private rights . . . the strength of
the feudal organization produced a profound effect on all branches of the law.
Practically all personal services of every sort took the form of land tenure. In
place of contracts for work and labor of the modem law, we find land held by
tenure of rendering services for the overlord.
W. PAGE, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1-11 (1920).
51. Obviously, there had been agreements between parties during feudalism. In-
deed, the basic land-based agreement between vassal and lord would today be considered
a contract. But the feudal mindset was different. The society was based on real property
and structured around the status relationships derived through grants to use real prop-
erty (the tenure system). These grants were life-long or longer than life-long (inherita-
ble). And the status derived from these land grants defined the party's role in society
more broadly. Hence, a failure to fulfill the basic feudal pledges of fealty were perceived
more as a severing of an ongoing status relationship than as a failure to fulfill an agree-
ment or "contract." For example, Cribbet asserts "the tenurial relationship was a highly
personal one" (not at all like our modem "arms length" view relative to contract law). J.
CRInBEr, supra note 8, at 32. A further example of the difference of the feudal mind: the
tenant could be stripped of his tenancy if he was convicted of a felony regardless of
whether the particular crime had anything directly to do with his ability to fulfill his
tenurial obligations. The feudal view was his blood had been tainted by the felony, i.e.,
he no longer deserved the status the tenure relationship brought to him.
52. Quoted in F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 20
(2d ed. 1970).
53. The merchant pure and simple, though convenient to the Crown, for whom
he collected taxes and provided loans, and to great establishments such as mon-
asteries, whose wool he bought in bulk, enjoyed the double unpopularity of an
alien and a parasite. The best practical commentary on the tepid indulgence
extended by theorists to the trader is the network of restrictions with which
medieval policy surrounded his activities.
R. TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 34 (1926).
54. Statute of Labourers, 1349, 23 Edw. 3.
55. Refusal of services that caused damage to a potential customer could create a
cause of action against the tradesman.
For example, a feudal judge wrote in 1443:
If I'm riding on the highway and I come to a village in which a smithy lives,
who has sufficient stuff to shoe my horse, if my horse has lost a shoe and I
request him to shoe him at proper time, and I offer him sufficient for his labor,
and he refuses, and if my horse is lost for want of shoes, and by his default, I
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The feudal world was a status-based world-a world where status,
rather than private agreements, determined society members' activi-
ties. Further, the status of the trader, in the land-based economy,
was a low status. Therefore, the common law, as exemplified by the
King's Bench, evolved basically around the law of property, the
source of feudal status and structure, not the law of agreement (or
contract) .56
As society moved into the Commercial Age" however, promissory
liability began to expand. Traders in the early sixteenth century ex-
changed bonds to secure their transactions. Therefore, common law
actions upon a failed bargain were usually brought as debt.58 The
cumbersomeness of such a practice was soon obvious and the com-
mon law, by the end of the century, began to recognize that action
would lay for the breach of a mere exchange of promises. For exam-
ple, in the 1588 case, Stangborough v. Warner,5 9 the court observed
"a promise against a promise will maintain an action upon the case,
as in consideration that you do give me ten pounds on such a day, I
propose to give you ten pounds such a day after."60
However, the early law of contract was viewed merely as a means
of setting the point of transfer of title for goods.6 1 Titles became
transferable upon mutual promises rather than upon the later physi-
say that in that event, I will have trespass on the case.
Y.B. 21 Hen. 6, ch. 55, pl. 12 (1443), quoted in F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, supra note
52, at 26-27.
56. See supra notes 50 and 51.
57. Leading contracts commentators Professors Kessler and Gilmore have written,
"the expansion of promissory liability may well reflect the profound change in the social
and economic organization of England caused by the Commercial Revolution, which be-
gan about 1500 and brought with it a radical shift in the climate of opinion with regard
to the trader." F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, supra note 52, at 29 (emphasis added).
58. M. RADIN, supra note 9, at 452.
59. 4 Leon. 3 (1588).
60. Fourteen years after Stangborough, the famous 1602 Slade's Case articulated
the doctrine explicitly that a cause of action lay for breach of an executory agreement:
Every contract executory imports in itself an assumpsit, for when one agrees to
pay money or to deliver anything, thereby he assumes or promises to pay or
deliver it; and therefore when one sells any goods to another and agrees to de-
liver them at a day to come, and the other in consideration thereof agrees to pay
so much money at such a day in that case, both parties may have an action of
debt of an action of the case on assumpsit, for the mutual executory agreements
of both parties imports in itself reciprocal actions upon the case as well as ac-
tions of debt.
4 Coke 91, 94.
61. Blackstone, writing in the mid-eighteenth century, discusses contract as part of
broader discussions of modes of transferring title. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES §§
440-70.
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cal exchange of goods. The first English treatise on contract e2 limited
remedies for failure to deliver goods on an executory contract to spe-
cific performance.63
Yet, the law needed to recognize contracts not merely as means to
secure title but as a source of entitlements to reasonably fix future
expectations. Having such entitlements is required by a market econ-
omy. ' 4 Cases recognizing such expectancy interests are apparent in
the records toward the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the
nineteenth century
6 5
Summation: Examinations of Feudal and Commercial Ages
Reveal Model for Jurisprudential Changes
This Comment has examined, again broadly, a great socio-eco-
nomic era. The Comment has asserted that the western world
changed drastically from approximately the turn of the sixteenth
century to the early nineteenth century. Market economies evolved
from an agrarian-based feudal system. Whereas the central resource
of the feudal economy was land, the central resource of the market
economy became goods of trade."6
The common law changed drastically over these years to reflect
these societal changes. Although the law changed in many areas, this
Comment has concentrated on the emergence of the law of contract
as that body of law which most obviously responds to the needs of
traders.
Again, a socio-economic system changed, thus altering the juris-
prudential system to legitimatize the relative individual accesses to
the central resource. The change of individual social and economic
expectations from expectations based on social status to those based
on bargains formed by the individual required the recognition of en-
titlements that flowed from individual agreements.
As with the Feudal Age, the changes in the legal system provided
a means by which an individual's entitlements to the primary re-
62. J. POWELL, ESSAY UPON THE LAW OF CONTRACT AND AGREEMENTS (1790).
63. Id. at 232-33.
64. M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 173-
74 (1977).
65. See, e.g., Davis v. Richardson, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 307 (1790) (state government
stocks); Shepherd v. Hampton, 16 U.S. 200 (1818) (commodity futures-specifically cot-
ton); Shepherd v. Johnson, 2 East. 211, 102 Eng. Rep. 349 (1802) (leading British
case-also involving stock delivery).
66. Admittedly "goods of trade" is not strictly or conventionally considered a sin-
gle "resource." But if viewed as a "collective resource," it is obvious that trade occupied
a position of centrality to the socio-economic system in the Commercial Age as land did
in the Feudal Age and as industrial capacity (or its necessary converse, labor capacity)
did in the Industrial Age and information does in the Information Age. The analysis that
is the core of the Comment requires the reader to approach the term "resource" in a
slightly unconventional, but nevertheless analytically valid, way.
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source could be converted to meet the individual's fundamental
needs, i.e., food and shelter. In the Feudal Age, the central resource,
land, was used directly (farming) and indirectly (the system of ten-
ure) to meet fundamental needs. In the Commercial Age, the profits
traders derived from their bargains could be used to purchase the
other goods and services which would meet their fundamental needs.
The Industrial Age: New Era Requires Development of New
Types of Entitlements
Historians generally place the start of the "industrial revolution"
in earnest as the early nineteenth century in Britain (after the War
of 1812)67 and the middle-to-late nineteenth century in the United
States 8 (after the Civil War)9
The coming of the Industrial Revolution coincided with other
nineteenth century changes which would logically facilitate more
rapid change in the common law.70 Various substantial changes did
occur: great changes in property doctrine designed to stimulate,
rather than stifle, economic development;7 1 modification or elimina-
tion of usury laws to create greater investment capital;7 2 stronger
differentiation between obligations owed due to agreement (contract)
67. G. COLE, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC HISTORY 1750-1950, at 61-66 (1967).
68. Id. at 45, 61-66.
69. As in other cases, the precise beginnings of the industrial revolution cannot be
placed with any great precision. Major inventions which were to be a fundamental source
of industrialism came into being in the late eighteenth or near the turn of the nineteenth
century. Major inventions would include Watt's steam engine patented in 1769, Watt's
double-acting engine in 1782, Whitney's cotton gin in 1794, the rotary printing press in
1790, and Fulton's steam ship in 1807. See, e.g., the charts at 200-21 in G. COLE, supra
note 67. There was some industry even as early as feudal times.
70. The Industrial Age changes that facilitated change in the common law in-
cluded a vast expansion of the formal reporting of case results and statutory codification
which meant that different jurisdictions would more rapidly become aware of legal evolu-
tion elsewhere. For a discussion of the expansion of formal case reporting, see generally
J. DILLON, supra note 25, at 264-92. For a discussion of the expansion of statutory codi-
fication, see, e.g., F. AUMANN, THE CHANGING AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, SOME SE-
LECTED PHASES 207-11 (1940). Further, other changes and inventions, particularly in
telecommunications and transportation affected communication among lawyers and ju-
rists. Importantly, the telegraph was invented in the mid-nineteenth century (1844) and
gradually its use was expanded. And similarly, the telephone was invented in the late-
nineteenth century (1876) and found even greater use. Rapid communication was ex-
panded not just by electrical impulse but on land and water with the growth of railroads
and canal building in the mid- and early nineteenth century, respectively. For notes on
canal expansion, see G. COLE, supra note 67, at 50. For a chronology of important inven-
tions, see the charts in G. COLE, supra note 67, at 200-206.
71. M. HORWITZ, supra note 64, at 31-42.
72. Id. at 237-45.
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and those owed due to general concepts of duty (tort);73 changes in
civil procedure;7 4 increased sophistication in areas such as insurance,
banking and finance; and Bill of Rights guarantees against state gov-
ernments under the 14th amendment.
7 5
Industrialization: Laissez-Faire and Social Welfare Doctrines
Urged
The central resource in an industrialized society is manufacturing
capacity and its necessary converse, laboring capacity. Obviously, as
we move from age to age, the central resource of the previous age
retains value and its corresponding jurisprudence remains useful.78
Many scholars, however, assert that nineteenth century common law
development was primarily used as a means to assist the fledgling
industrial base. 7 Scholars have often described the early Industrial
Age legal changes as being a "subsidization of economic growth."78
The industrial revolution began and progressed in Great Britain
just as a sophisticated law of contract was emerging. Therefore, the
jurisprudence of the early Industrial Age was formulated within a
philosophical context where large government interference was asso-
ciated with old regimes and a law of agreement, free from govern-
ment interference, was becoming dominant.7 9 Philosophical and legal
writings reinforced this dominance.80 Sir Henry Maine wrote in
1864, "the movement of the progressive societies has ...been a
movement from status to contract."81
Early law relating to labor contract negotiation, as exemplified by
the famous Supreme Court case of Lochner v. New York, 2 similarly
73. Id. at 201-10.
74. F. AUMANN, THE CHANGING AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, SOME SELECTED
PHASES 209-11 (1940).
75. U.S. CONST. amend. X (1868).
76. Industrial plants were placed on real property, and some elements of the law of
real property were carried forward from feudal times. Similarly, the end results of most
industrial processes were goods to be traded (or component parts to be made into goods
to be traded) and the law of the Commercial Age, particularly contract law, formed the
legal basis under which such industrial-related trade took place. Despite the overlap, it is
undeniable that the focus of each age changes as its central resource changes.
77. M. HORWITZ, supra note 64, at 63-108.
78. Id.
79. For a comparison of dates compare notes 64 and 65 and accompanying text
(establishment of a sophisticated law of contract) with note 67 and accompanying text
(beginning of Industrial Age in Great Britain).
80. For example, Britain's Herbert Spencer was very influential as a formulator
and advocate of laissez-faire ideology. Spencer's 1850 book, Social Statics, had great
influence in Britain and in America.
81. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 165 (1864). In a similar vein, Adam Smith had
written earlier, "society is far advanced before a contract can sustain action or the
breach of it be redressed." A. SMITH, LECTURES ON JUSTICE, POLICY, REVENUE AND
ARMS quoted in F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, supra note 52, at 19.
82. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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took a pro-freedom of contract, and therefore, pro-industrialization
approach. 3 In Lochner, the Court found a New York statute, limit-
ing the hours that bakers could work, was an unconstitutional intru-
sion into the bakery employee's liberty guaranteed by the 14th
amendment.8 Lochner was, of course, one in a series of cases invali-
dating government attempts to interfere with the freedom of con-
tract between employers and employees.8 5 Such an approach ignored
the great differentiation in bargaining strengths between employers8"
and employees and, in actuality, again assisted industrialization.17
However, some commentators assert that the Lochner decision
83. Tort law is also a frequent focus of the protection of industrialization orienta-
tion of nineteenth-century jurisprudence. Particular attention, in this regard, is paid to
theories concerning personal and property damage resulting from industrial accidents.
From an earlier eighteenth-century concept of strict liability for direct injury, the early
nineteenth-century common law adopted the concept that negligence should determine
liability for injuries. The law then gradually adopted rules of duty which virtually insu-
lated industry from liability by drastically narrowing the circumstances under which neg-
ligence could be found. Later commentators viewed these duty rules as primarily an at-
tempt to assist industrialization. See generally L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LAW 409-27 (1973); M. HoRwiTz, supra note 64, at 67-108; Gregory, Trespass to Neg-
ligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359 (1951); Ursin, Judicial Creativity in
Tort Law, 49 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 229 (1981). But see Schwartz, Tort Law and the
Economy in Nineteenth Century America: A Reinterpretation 90 YALE L.J. 1717 (1981)
(asserting that a complete review of all California and New Hampshire nineteenth-cen-
tury tort decisions disputes the conventional view that the judiciary insulated industry to
injured plaintiffs' detriment).
84. Specifically, the liberty being restricted, according to the Court's majority, was
the liberty for the bakery employee to contract to work more than the statutorily pre-
scribed 10 hours a day.
[T]he employee may desire to earn the extra money, which would arise from his
working more than the prescribed time, but this statute forbids the employer
from permitting the employee to earn it. The statute necessarily interferes with
the right of contract between the employer and employees. The general right to
make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual
protected by the 14th Amendment. . . . [Allgeyer.] . . . The right to purchase
or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected by this amendment.
198 U.S. at 52-53.
85. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) and Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U.S. 1 (1915).
86. For a later contrary acknowledgement by the Court that groups of employees
often possess an unequally weak bargaining position relative to employers, see West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). For a general discussion of unequal bar-
gaining strengths between employees and employers see F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE,
supra note 52, at 7-10.
87. "According to [the] theory [of] inherent unequal bargaining power between
[employer and employee], many an industrial empire has strengthened its power by em-
ploying contract as a weapon of industrial warfare." F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, supra
note 52, at 7.
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protected constitutionally mandated economic liberties. 88 State
courts had adopted a similar Lochner-like laissez-faire approach.89
And earlier Supreme Court decisions90 and dissents91 had adopted a
laissez-faire approach to government interference, in contract as well
as other areas of economic planning.92 Lochner stated the laissez-
faire approach these earlier decisions and dissents advocated was not
merely beneficial, but indeed was constitutionally mandated.9 3 Jus-
tice Holmes, in his Lochner dissent, complained bitterly that "[tlhe
14th amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer'S94 social stat-
ics [and the] constitution is not intended to embody a particular eco-
nomic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the
citizen to the state or of laissez-faire. ' 95 Despite Holmes' protests,
the majority of the Court continued to adopt a laissez-faire orienta-
tion and subsequent decisions continued to prevent government from
interfering with employment contract negotiation. The two leading
cases were Adair v. United States" and Coppage v. Kansas.
97
It is difficult to reconcile the Courts' actions in the Lochner-Adair-
88. See, e.g., B. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 120-25
(1980).
89. As evidence of state courts' acceptance of this perspective, Professor Siegan
has observed:
Between 1885 and 1894 high courts in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Massachu-
setts, Missouri, Illinois, Ohio, Nebraska, Colorado, California, and Arkansas
followed the same general approach. One line of cases denied the legislature the
power to regulate the terms of employment between employer and employee,
except when health and life were clearly affected and when one of the parties
was either a minor, a sailor, or a woman who had not been granted the privi-
leges of the married woman's acts. The basis for these decisions was that such
regulation constituted unreasonable denial to the employer and employee of lib-
erty or property without due process of law, and/or was class legislation, for the
legislature had attempted to interfere with the private rights of certain
individuals.
B. SIEGAN, supra note 88, at 56-57.
90. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (the leading case pre-Lochner,
prohibiting a state interference with contract. The case arose in the context of insurance
law.).
91. For example, 13 years before Lochner, in a dissent, Justice Brewer wrote, "The
paternal theory of government is to me odious. The utmost possible liberty to the individ-
ual and the fullest protection to him and his property is both the limitation and duty of
government." Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 551 (1797).
92. In the famous "Slaughter House Cases" which allowed state monopolies to
continue to exist in the slaughtering industry, Justice Bradley wrote in dissent:
In my view, a law which prohibits a large class of citizens from adopting a
lawful employment, or from following a lawful employment previously adopted,
does deprive them of liberty as well as property, without due process of law.
Their right of choice is a portion of their liberty; their occupation is their
property.
83 U.S. 36, 122 (1873).
93. 198 U.S. at 45.
94. See supra note 80 for a discussion of Herbert Spencer and his importance.
95. 198 U.S. at 75.
96. 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (the court found unconstitutional a federal statute against
railroad employment contracts requiring union membership as a prerequisite to
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Coppage pro-freedom of contract cases with other cases from the
same era which allowed government interference. Examples of the
latter group include state laws limiting the hours for underground
miners,98 women, 99 or factory workers.100 The Court upheld these
statutes between 1898 and 1917, the same general eras as Lochner-
Adair-Coppage.
One explanation for the apparent inconsistency in Court holdings
may be the Court's reluctance to adopt a status-based approach to
legal disputes. A status-based source of entitlements, was, as Sir
Henry Maine had asserted, 01  representative of the old re-
gimes-considered either too ancient (feudal) or too anti-develop-
ment (early mercantilism) compared to the newer law of agree-
ment.102 Moreover, Maine attributed American prosperity in the late
employment).
In Adair, Justice Harlan wrote
[The] right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper [is]
the same as the right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions. [The]
employer and the employee have equality of right, and any legislation that dis-
turbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract.
208 U.S. at 174-75.
97. 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (the Court found unconstitutional a state statute with a
similar type of intent as the federal statute voided in Adair v. United States, 208 U.S.
161 (1908)).
In Coppage, Justice Pitney asserted,
Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of private property [is] the
right to make contracts. [An] interference with this liberty so serious as that
now under consideration, and so disturbing of equality of right, must be deemed
to be arbitrary . . . .No doubt, wherever the right of private property exists,
there must and will be inequalities of fortune; and thus it naturally happens that
parties negotiating about a contract are not equally unhampered by circum-
stances. This applies to all contracts, and not merely to that between employer
and employee. [I]t is from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of
contract and the right of private property without at the same time recognizing
as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of the
exercise of those rights. But the [14th Amendment] recognizes "Liberty" and
"property" as co-existent human rights, and debars the States from any unwar-
ranted interference with either.
236 U.S. at 17.
98. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (limited miners' work day to eight
hours).
99. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
100. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (limited factory employees' work
day to ten hours).
101. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
102. Dean Pound commented on the formation of these attitudes: "In the nine-
teenth century the feudal contribution to the common law was in disfavor. . . the nine-
teenth century deduction of law from a metaphysical principle of individual liberty...
combined to make jurists and lawyers think ill of anything that had the look of the
archaic institution of status." R. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 27-28
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eighteenth century to its jurisprudence, "[a]ll this beneficent pros-
perity reposes on the sacredness of contract and the stability of pri-
vate property; the first the implement, and the last the reward, of
success in the universal competition.
10 3
However, the prosperity Maine acknowledges was apparently not
universal. The living conditions of the industrial working class
pointed out the need for relief. The lower classes of other socio-eco-
nomic eras 104 may or may not have been economically better off than
the proletariat of the Industrial Age, but their plight 05 was certainly
more diffuse and less starkly visible. The urbanization that came
with industrialization0 " caused the working class to be more visibly
massed in cities, creating pressure for social welfare reform.107 Much
social welfare legislation was passed to help the working class, as a
class, or sub-classes such as working women,108 bakers 09 or under-
ground miners.110
But more fundamentally, the working class required a system of
entitlements that gave greater value to the resource they possessed.
This section of the Comment began by stating that the Industrial
Age created a dual central resource-manufacturing capacity and
its necessary converse, laboring capacity. 11 Industrialization came to
(1906).
103. H. MAINE, ESSAY ON POPULAR GOVERNMENT, quoted in J. DILLON, supra
note 25, at 211.
104. R. HEILERONER, THE MAKING OF EcONOMIC SocIErY 79 (3rd ed. 1970).
105. Id. at 74-80.
106. Id. at 92.
107. S. CLOUGH & R. RAPP, supra note 22, at 379. Actually the United States
was late in constructing social welfare programs to combat Industrial Age social
problems. See, e.g., G. COLE, supra note 67, at 5-6.
108. Oregon statute limiting the maximum hours of work for women held constitu-
tional in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
109. New York statute limiting the maximum hours of work for undergound min-
ers held constitutional in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
110. Utah statute limiting the maximum hours of work for underground miners
held constitutional in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
111. This Comment has stated the central resource for the Industrial Age was
manufacturing capacity and its necessary converse, laboring capacity. This is the first
example of a dual-element central resource. But that characterization of the resource is
due to the unique nature of it.
Under feudalism, all benefited, the king to the serf, from the central resource, land.
Trade, on the other hand, was conceived of as more individualistic-the result of ad hoc
relationships between entrepreneurs and merchants. Hence, during the Commercial Age
the central resource, which, while it determined the identity of the age, was not con-
ceived of as benefiting the mass of society that remained agrarian.
Industrialization created a circumstance unlike feudalism, wherein all members of so-
ciety could benefit from the same central resource (land), or the Commercial Age,
wherein only a minority benefited directly from the central resource, goods for trade. The
manufacturing done under industrialization could benefit the mass of society but only if
that mass aided in the industrial process by selling its laboring capacity. That laboring
capacity, likewise, was needed by the industrial concerns. Hence, both components of the
central resource were necessary for the resource to exist and function and for it to pro-
vide the society members a means to obtain the necessities of life.
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dominate all aspects of society and was expected to provide a means
of livelihood to the mass of society. But the masses could not directly
benefit from the resource of manufacturing capacity. They needed to
sell the resource they possessed-laboring capacity. And they be-
lieved their bargaining position was stronger when they were dealt
with as a group. Those desiring the improvement of living conditions
for the working class urged, therefore, a group or status orientation
to society's resource entitlement system. Indeed, industrialization-in-
spired jurisprudence can primarily be viewed as combining a status
configuration of the working class, similar to vassals of the Feudal
Age, and a massive contracting paradigm, originated by manufactur-
ers in the Commercial Age. The changes in the common law, in the
area of labor contract, can be seen as a tug-of-war between the lais-
sez-faire/freedom of contract ideology from the recently completed
Commercial Age and a status paradigm, similar to feudalism. This
tug-of-war between contract and status was manifested in the appar-
ent inconsistent lines of the Supreme Court decisions over the
"Lochner era. 11 2
New Deal Resolves the Conflict
The conflict of whether workers should be treated as a class in
labor contracting was, in a sense, resolved by the great depression.
The grand industrial system broke down, casting doubt on the asser-
tions of the defenders of its laissez-faire underpinnings. The eco-
nomic hardships visited on the American working class, as a class,
caused a vast majority to vote for candidates who were clearly social
welfarists. The Roosevelt Administration and a liberal democratic
Congress came to power in 1933 prepared to assist massive classes of
people, as classes.118
112. Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) with Muller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 426 (1917).
113. One example, away from the the labor-management area, where the
Roosevelt advocates were prepared to view and treat people as a class was the tradition-
ally more individualistic area of agriculture.
It was the severe misfunction of the market mechanism in agriculture. The
problem, we will remember, arose in large part from two causes: the nature of
the inelastic demand for farm products, and the highly competitive, "atomistic"
structure of the agricultural market itself. The New Deal could not alter the
first cause, the inelasticity of demand. . . .But it could change the condition of
supply which hurled itself, self-destructively, against an unyielding demand.
Hence, one of the earliest pieces of New Deal legislation-the Agricultural Ad-
justment Act-sought to establish machinery by which farmers as a group,
could accomplish what they could not as competitive individuals: curtailment of
output.
1095
Perhaps chief amongst the classes of people to be assisted were
industrial workers in their efforts of urging a jurisprudence more val-
uing their side of the central resource-laboring capacity. That re-
source was their most valuable "property" 114 and it was necessary
that the evolving system of industrialization-inspired entitlements
give greater value to their primary property in order for them to
better meet their fundamental needs. The route to achieve these
goals was to deal with broad social problems and immediate work-
place problems as a group. Social legislation must be passed, they
urged, to assist the working class, as a class, and to insure the right
to negotiate labor contracts as a group. Major attempts to set mini-
mum wage and maximum hours limitations were included in the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933115 and in legislation
enabled by the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) passed
in 1935.116 The U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the wage and hours
provisions of these statutes 17 as violating the Commerce Clause.'1
Such decisions resisting the New Deal infuriated Roosevelt and he
responded with his famous "court-packing" plan-a threat to ex-
pand the court to potentially 15 members. 1 9 Whether responding to
the court-packing challenge or not,120 Justice Roberts changed his
position within a year on two subsequent key decisions with similar
subject matter. In National Labor Relations Board v. Jones &
R. HEILBRONER, supra note 104, at 142 (emphasis added). The Agricultural Adjustment
Act was later ruled unconstitutional in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
114. The description of laboring capacity as an element of property had been
around at least since the late eighteenth century. Both Adam Smith and John Locke had
urged this conception of laboring capacity. See discussion in B. SIEGAN, supra note 88,
at 58.
115. National Industry Recovery Act (NIRA), ch. 89, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
116. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
117. The NIRA was invalidated in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935). A provision of the Wagner Act was invalidated in Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
118. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. In the Lochner line of cases (see supra note 84),
the Court utilized the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend
XIV, § 1, cl. 3, to invalidate government interference with labor contracts. With
Schechter and Carter Coal (see supra note 117), the Court utilized the Commerce
Clause, U.S. CONsT. art. I., § 8, cl. 3. Although these decisions are based on interpreta-
tions of different clauses of the constitution and are 20 to 30 years apart, they can be
interpreted as consistent examples of the Court's continuing reluctance to allow massive
government interference with labor contracts.
During the Schechter and Carter Coal period, the Court turned yet again to the 14th
Amendment to find the means to invalidate a minimum wage law (for women) in
Morehead v. New York ex reL Tipold, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
119. The Roosevelt "court-packing" plan called for appointing an additional jus-
tice to the Court for every one that did not resign within six months after his 70th birth-
day. It limited, however, the total potential membership of the court to a maximum of
15.
120. For a discussion of Roberts' seemingly incompatible votes see G. GUNTHER,
supra note 11, at 152.
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Laughlin Steel Corp.,121 the Court upheld the constitutionality of
the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.12 And in West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish1 23 the Court held constitutional a Washington
State statute setting minimum wages for women.
The West Coast decision specifically rejected absolute freedom of
contract regardless of the social consequences. Chief Justice Hughes
wrote,
[T]he violation [of due process] alleged by those attacking minimum wage
regulation for women is deprivation of freedom of contract. What is this
freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks
of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of
law. In prohibiting that deprivation the Constitution does recognize an ab-
solute and uncontrollable liberty. . . . [T]he liberty safeguarded is liberty
in a social organization which requires the protection of law against the
evils which menace the health, safety, morals and welfare of the people.
Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints
of due process, and regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject
and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process. This essen-
tial limitation of liberty in general governs freedom of contract in
particular.
124
Thus the dual strains of decisions continued, i.e., those favoring
the individual/absolute freedom of contract approach to social enti-
tlements 2 5 and those acknowledging a group/status approach.1 26
Summation of Industrial Age Jurisprudence: a dual central re-
source inspires a dual-faceted approach to socio-economic
entitlements
This Comment has again examined legal evolution during a socio-
economic era. Since the early nineteenth century, common law coun-
tries had drastically changed, socially, economically and legally.
From a basically agrarian society linked by individual traders (or
121. 301 U.S. 1 (1935).
122. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
123. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
124. Id. at 391-92. The West Coast Hotel decision, upholding a state statute set-
ting minimum wage laws for women, was handed down within a month of Morehead v.
New York ex rel. Tipold, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (see supra note 118), invalidating a
similar statute. Such a switch in results was similar to the switch in results found by
comparing the Carter Coal and Jones & Laughlin decisions (see supra text accompany-
ing notes 115-21).
125. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S.
161 (1908); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
126. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366
(1898); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nat'l Labor Relations
Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1935).
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small companies of traders), industrialization caused huge propor-
tions of people to move into crowded cities and work on and with
machines.
The examinations of the two previous socio-economic eras yielded
two different approaches to the society's allocation of socio-economic
entitlements based on relation to the age's central resource. The Feu-
dal Age's central resource was land and the medieval system of enti-
tlements was based on status. The Commercial Age's central re-
source was goods for trade and contract law, which evolved as a
response to the Commercial Age, and awarded entitlements based on
bargains agreed to by individuals.
The Industrial Age featured a dual-faceted central resource, i.e.,
manufacturing capacity and its converse, laboring capacity. The ju-
risprudential battle the age witnessed and the system of entitlements
it eventually evolved recognized the value of both resources. Two
strains of judicial opinions and jurisprudential theories existed simul-
taneously. The first strain articulated an approach to socio-economic
entitlements which were individualistic/contract-oriented and ap-
plied theories which were carryovers from the Commercial Age. The
second articulated a group/status/social welfare orientation (as did
the feudal jurisprudence). That the two approaches to socio-eco-
nomic entitlements would exist during the Industrial Age is consis-
tent with its dual-faceted central resource and with the jurispruden-
tial history through which the common law had passed (feudalism
and the Commercial Age).
THE INFORMATION AGE AND ITS JURISPRUDENCE EXAMINED
The Information Age is here and its effects are pervasive. As early
as 1967, a U.S. government study127 found that a quarter of the
country's gross national product (GNP) was produced in the "pri-
mary information sector" i.e., "that part of the economy that pro-
duces, processes, and distributes information goods and services. In-
cluded here are computer manufacturing, telecommunications,
printing, mass media, advertising, accounting, and education. 128
The study also attempted to identify individuals who held informa-
tion jobs in non-information companies. Adding these "secondary in-
formation sector" 129 people, the total information segment of the
economy accounted for 46 percent of the GNP and more than 53
percent of income earned. 130
The percentage of the economy produced by information sources
127. M. PORAT, INFORMATION ECONOMY: DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT (1977)
quoted in J. NAISBITT, supra note 6, at 20-21.
128. J. NAISBITT, supra note 6, at 20.
129. Id. at 21.
130. Id.
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has since increased markedly.131 By 1976, the percentage of individ-
uals working in information-related occupations passed the 50 per-
cent range. 32 Projections call for such workers to represent 66 per-
cent of the workforce by the turn of the 21st century.1 33
However, the law has not changed anywhere close to proportion-
ately. To date there have been no major doctrinal changes in the
common law that can be identified as a reaction to the societal
changes brought about by the Information Age. It is usual for com-
mon law to change slowly.134 Indeed, this Comment has observed
that each of the major changes in the law which were inspired by a
socio-economic age occurred well into or at the end of their age. 35
But this natural tendency is particularly troublesome in the informa-
tion area, which emphasizes constant innovation. Furthermore, this
Comment has observed that each succeeding major socio-economic
age has been increasingly briefer.136 Alvin Toffler predicts that the
Information Age1 37 should play itself out within the current genera-
tion's lifetime. 13 Given the pace of innovation and the probable
brevity of the Information Age, the natural tendency for the com-
mon law to change slowly becomes stultifying. A leading Southern
California practitioner in the areas of copyright and patent has
written,
[T]he law is too often ill-adapted to the fast-moving traffic of our ever-
changing world. Under our system of jurisprudence, bold innovations are
seldom seen. Instead, our courts and legislatures try laboriously to graft
new principals upon the old Common Law Stock. The resulting patchwork
of case law and statutes forever seems to lag far behind the needs of society.
131. Hamrin, The Information Economy, THE FUTURIST, Aug. 1981, at 25-26.
132. Moliter, The Information Society: The Path to Post-Industrial Growth, THE
FUTURIST, Aug. 1981, at 23.
133. Id.
134. Charmasson, Patents, Copyrights, and Computer Programs, 31 DICTA 19, 19
(1984).
135. For example: the sophisticated real property system that modern thinkers as-
sociate with feudalism did not occur until the end of the feudal period; the law of con-
tract did not develop in a sophisticated manner until the eighteenth century whereas the
Commercial Age began around 1500; and a sophisticated approach to labor rights was
not recognized until after the Great Depression of the 1930's-well after the beginning
of the industrial revolution which occurred after the Civil War.
136. This Comment has asserted previously that evolution of feudal property law
took centuries, evolution of contract law took more than one century and most of the
doctrinal concepts arising out of the Industrial Age took decades to formulate and spread
throughout common law jurisprudence.
137. A. TOFFLER, supra note 5. Toffier actually coined his own terminology to re-
fer to the current socio-economic age: The Third Wave. But he acknowledges that the
Information Age is synonomous for his Third Wave. Id. at 9.
138. Id. at 10.
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The problem is acutely felt in the area of intellectual property law whose
main goal is to protect newly developed technology. 13 9
Holistic Approach Useful. A Model-"New Property"
An important step in jurisprudential correcting for the undervalu-
ing of certain interests, such as information interests, is the percep-
tion of a constellation of interests as a unity. Failure to perceive a
body of interests holistically leads to undervaluing because each enti-
tlement asserted and each cause of action litigated is viewed singu-
larly, in insolation, and is much easier to reject when thus viewed. A
collective undervaluing often is not perceivable under these circum-
stances because the law views each unsuccessful case as the mere
refusal of a cause of action to a given individual plaintiff and each
denial of an assertion of an entitlement as the refusal to just one
individual or group. Under these circumstances, a gross undervaluing
of interests may remain utterly unperceived-a jurisprudential miss-
ing of the forest for the trees.
A recent, important attempt to correct a similar misperception oc-
curred in the mid-sixties. Professor Charles Reich perceived that a
constellation of interests involving entitlements from the federal gov-
ernment were undervalued. In his article, The New Property,
140
Reich examined what he termed the "public interest state."141 His
analysis included not just the grants normally associated with social
welfarism, such as public assistance and retirement funds (social se-
curity), but the whole range of government entitlements. These ex-
amples of "government largess"142 included government jobs, occu-
pational licenses, government franchises, contracts, services, and
access to government resources.
143
Reich contended that the government's taxing and regulatory
power, and its dispersing of largess, vastly rearranged both wealth
and power. "Government is a gigantic siphon. It draws in revenue
and power, and pours forth wealth: money, benefits, services. Today's
distribution of largess is on a vast, imperial scale. 1 44 Reich further
asserted these entitlements had been
steadily taking the place of traditional forms of wealth-forms which are
held as private property. The wealth of more and more Americans depends
upon a relationship to government. Increasingly, Americans live on govern-
ment largess-allocated by government on its own terms, and held by recip-ients subject to conditions which express "the public interest.
139. Charmasson, supra note 134, at 19.
140. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
141. Id. at 733, 778.
142. Id. at 733.
143. Id. at 734-37.
144. Id. at 733.
145. Id.
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Reich asserted, therefore, that the judiciary must recognize these
new forms of wealth as a new property worthy of protection and due
process safeguards.
The Reich article was highly influential in inspiring what has been
called the "procedural due process revolution.' 4 6 Justice Brennan
cited Reich while writing the cornerstone case for the due process
revolution, Goldberg v. Kelly. 147 In Goldberg, the Court majority
held welfare benefits could not be terminated without an evidentiary
hearing prior to termination.4 8
The Goldberg decision, inspired by Reich's article urging a holistic
approach to government entitlements, inspired "a flood of suits seek-
ing review of administrative procedure that operated adversely to the
claimants."1 49 Included in the "flood" of suits were cases with such
disparate subject matters as the termination of social security disa-
bility benefits,' the suspension of driver's licenses,' 5' the firing of
policemen without a hearing for cause, 152 and the reasonableness of
gas service termination notices from a municipally owned utility.1
5 3
A similar holistic approach to informational entitlements would be
valuable in countering their undervaluing as Reich's approach to
government entitlements. Presently, the law stands similarly posi-
tioned as to informational interests as it did in 1964 before the pub-
lishing of the "New Property.' 54 As examples, cases regarding enti-
tlements such as design of computer software, intercepted data
during telecommunications transfer, the right of celebrities to control
the telling of their own biographies over the airwaves, and access to
government information were approached in an isolated manner.
To make clearer the potential benefits of a holistic approach to
informational entitlements, this Comment will first briefly review
how the law has dealt with two informational interests and then dis-
cuss a specific potentially beneficial regime to be derived from a ho-
listic approach.
146. G. GUNTHER, supra note 11, at 647-48.
147. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
148. 397 U.S. at 261.
149. B. SIEGAN, supra note 88, at 245.
150. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
151. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
152. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
153. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Graft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
154. Reich, supra note 140.
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Right of Publicity-Early Attempt to Protect an Information-
Type Interest
An early attempt to protect an information interest involved the
recognition of the right of publicity. The history of the right of pub-
licity can be viewed as typical of new entitlements which evolve to
correspond to interests which arise near the beginning of a new
socio-economic age. First, a socio-economic or technical change cre-
ates a new interest. Efforts to protect entitlements arising in relation
to that new interest are attempted under existing common law doc-
trine. If that proves unsatisfactory, a new entitlement is recognized,
but its entitlements are construed narrowly. A full exploitation of the
entitlement is not therefore likely until recognition of a new doctrinal
base for the entitlement and possibly an accompanying new proce-
dural mechanism for its awarding.
The right of publicity has been defined as "the pecuniary value
which attaches to the names and pictures of public figures, particu-
larly athletes and entertainers, and the right of such people to this
financial benefit." 155
Such entitlements are often closely associated with the privacy-
related tort of appropriation. Appropriation was one of four types of
privacy interests which Dean Prosser listed as deserving of protec-
tion.156 The tort is defined as "appropriation of one's name or like-
ness for another's benefit."' 57
However, the interest which celebrities normally wish protected is
not "to be let alone"' 58 (the interest most often cited as being pro-
tected by privacy) rather, it is to be compensated for exploitation of
their fame. Nevertheless, these celebrities brought many causes
based upon the violation of their privacy rights' 59 in an attempt to
compel such compensation. The suits were often unsuccessful be-
155. Chaplin v. National Broadcasting Co., 15 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
156. The four types of privacy interests isolated by Prosser are (1) intrusion upon
physical solitude, (2) public disclosure of private facts, (3) publicity that places someone
in a false light and (4) appropriation of one's name or likeness for another's benefit. It is
the fourth interest upon which this Comment focuses. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L.
REv. 383, 389 (1960).
157. Id. Prosser's scheme for division of privacy interests was carried forward by
the RESTATEMENT OF TORS (SEcoND) § 652A-E.
158. The phrase right "to be let alone" originates with Judge Cooley in T. Coo-
LEY, LAW OF TORTS (2d ed. 1888). Judge Cooley's phrase was cited by Samuel Warren
and Louis Brandeis as describing the interests protected by privacy in their seminal arti-
cle, Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 195 (1890). The
Warren and Brandeis article is generally credited with originating the recognition of pri-
vacy as a protectable interest. See M. FRANKLIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MASS ME-
DIA LAW 190 (2d ed. 1982).
159. Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 1004 (W.D. Okla.
1938) (movie stars); Martin v. F.I.Y. Theatre Co., 10 Ohio Op. 338 (1938) (live stage
performer); O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941) (famous football
player).
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cause courts held plaintiffs had "waived" their right of privacy by
their public performance.6 0
One such unsuccessful suit occurred less than a year before the
recognition of the right of publicity. In Gautier v. Pro-Football
Inc.,' an animal trainer had contracted to perform his act at the
half-time of a football game. Besides being viewed by the live audi-
ence, the act was telecast. Plaintiff sued to be compensated by the
television station and was denied relief. A concurring opinion, how-
ever, stressed the inadequacy of privacy rights to protect the plain-
tiff's interest in such situations. "Privacy is the one thing he (plain-
tiff) did not want or need in his occupation. His real complaint, and
perhaps a justified one, but one we cannot redress in this suit
brought under the New York Right of Privacy statutes, is that he
was not paid for the telecasting of his show."1 62
Shortly after Gautier, Judge Jerome Frank of the Second Circuit
wrote an opinion recognizing the right of publicity.163 Shortly there-
after, Professor Melville Nimmer wrote a "seminal"'" article'6 5
compellingly justifying the right of publicity and explaining why al-
ternative theories had been unable to adequately protect such
interests. e1 6
The right of publicity is an early example of an Information Age-
type interest. The right was recognized near the period of the first
widespread use of television 67 and was recognized with awareness of
the explosion of mass communication. "With the tremendous strides
in communications, advertising, and entertainment techniques, the
160. See cases cited supra note 159 and see, e.g., Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal. App. 2d
704, 705, 211 P.2d 320, 321 (1949) (public person-the Marx Brothers--"relinquishes a
part of his privacy"); Johnson v. Boeing Airplane Co., 175 Kan. 275, 282-83, 262 P.2d
808, 813-14 (1953) (specific permission for one photograph deemed waiver for others).
161. 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952).
162. Id. at 361, 107 N.E.2d at 489-90.
163. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
164. Nimmer's article was cited as seminal in Hoffman, Limitations on the Right
of Publicity, 28 BUL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y OF THE U.S.A. 111 (1980).
165. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 203 (1954).
166. Nimmer cites other theories besides privacy as being inadequate also: Offen-
sive use of False Light, Unfair Competition, Contract Theory, Defamation, and Trade
Libel.
167. The late 1940's-early 1950's time period, immediately preceding when the
article was written (1953), marked the first widespread use of television. For example, in
1948 less than an estimated one million (977,000) television sets were in use. By 1951,
the use had risen to more than 15 million (15,637,000) and by 1952, more than 21
million (21,782,000). TV BOOK (J. Freman ed. 1977) quoting TELEVISION FACTBOOK
(1977).
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public personality has found that the use of his name, photograph,
and likeness has taken on a pecuniary value undreamed of at the
turn of the century."' 68
In the intervening 30 years since the right of publicity was recog-
nized, successful causes of action brought under it are rare. Al-
though it is often described as a "property right," 169 few cases have
recognized it as descendible, an often-cited quality of property.
17 0
The right is vulnerable to virtually any First Amendment challenge,
including one involving the facetious "campaign for president" by a
television comedian.
17 1
One case in which a first amendment defense was not successful
was Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,1 72 the first case
in which the Supreme Court recognized the right to publicity.17 3 In
Zacchini, a news organization broadcast a circus-type act'74 despite
the performer's specific requests not to broadcast the act. Justice
White said the first amendment does not require that a news organi-
zation be allowed to expropriate a performer's "entire act.
' 17 5
The Supreme Court's recognition of the right of publicity does not
seem to have increased the chances of recovery. 7 The right remains
narrowly construed, particularly against First Amendment
challenges.177
168. Nimmer, supra note 165, at 204.
169. See, e.g., Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205, 1206 (8th Cir. 1969);
Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro
Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 908 (1979).
170. Compare Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors, Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th
Cir. 1980) with Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 908 (6th Circuit refused to recognize the descendibility of Elvis Pres-
ley's right of publicity while the 2nd Circuit two years earlier had recognized the right).
Other cases not allowing descendibility under the facts of the cases include, e.g., Lugosi
v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979); Hicks v.
Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg
Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 602 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979); Rosemont Enterprises,
Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1, 294 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Sup. Ct. 1968), af'd
mem., 32 A.D.2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (App. Div. 1969).
171. Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501
(Sup. Ct. 1968) (protection afforded to makers of posters of a comedian who, as part of
his act, made facetious "speeches" as part of a satirical presidential "campaign").
172. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
173. Id. at 564.
174. The act was that of a human cannonball.
175. 433 U.S. at 564.
176. See, e.g., Memphis Dev. Foundation v. Factors, Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.
1980) (Elvis Presley); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prod., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d
454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979) (Rudolph Valentino); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25
Cal. 3d 913, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464
F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Agatha Christie).
177. See, e.g., Frosch v. Grossett & Dunlap, 4 Media L. Rep. 2307, 2308 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1979) (suit by heirs of famous actress Marilyn Monroe to recover damages for
invasion of right of publicity rejected summarily by Court due to First Amendment
defense).
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This Comment's examination of the history of the right of public-
ity can help illustrate how the entitlement evolution model, men-
tioned at the beginning of this subsection,178 functions. A socio-eco-
nomic or technical change (the popularization of electronic mass
media, particularly television) created an interest (the possible com-
mercial exploitation of fame over the airwaves). Initially, efforts are
made to protect the new interest under existing common law doc-
trines; in this case, appropriation and the right of privacy were uti-
lized. If that process proves unsatisfactory, and celebrity plaintiffs
such as Gautier found that the process was, then a new entitlement,
such as the right of publicity, is recognized. The new entitlement,
however, is construed narrowly. This Comment will next discuss a
possible new doctrinal base and procedural mechanism for informa-
tion-related entitlements.
Computer Software: Litigating within the cracks of traditional
statutory protection
Attempts to protect innovative computer software presented a dif-
ficult problem due to the traditional demands of the two most used
statutory methods for protection of intellectual property--copyright
and patent. The nature of computer software suggested it was des-
tined to fall within the cracks of traditional protections.
The Patent Act 19 demands three tests be met. A discovery, to be
patented, must be "useful,"' 180 "novel,""8 1 and not "obvious to a per-
son having ordinary skill in the technical field related to the discov-
ery." 1 8 2 Patents may be granted for a new and useful "process, ma-
chine, manufacture, composition of matter and other invention." 183
But no patent will be granted for "methods of doing business, newly
discovered laws of nature or for purely mental processes.' "
The Copyright Act185 protects "original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression."1 8 The act provides that in
no case does the protection extend to "any idea, procedure, process,
178. See supra text preceding note 155.
179. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-596, 88 Stat. 1949 (codified at Title 35 of
the United States Code).
180. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
181. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
182. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
183. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
184. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
185. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. V 1981).
186. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. V 1981).
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system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery.1187
"Accordingly, copyright does not extend to something utilitarian.
Protection for a process, a method, or a utilitarian article must be
sought under patent law." ' 8
With respect to computer software, under which of these pre-ex-
isting statutory schemes would this important information-related
potential entitlement be protected? The software would seem to pos-
sess elements that would both qualify and disqualify it from both
statutory regimes.
The subjects of computer software programs are often useful,
novel, and non-obvious. However, the "machine" or "composition of
matter"1 19 involved-the computer itself, the hardware-remains the
same from task to task-non-novel, and outside the Patent Act, non-
statutory. The software program, however, could be construed as a
non-statutory, "purely mental process." Further, a program will in-
evitably involve mathematical formulae which could be construed as
"newly discovered laws of nature,"190 also outside the statute.
Conversely, copyright also presents problems. Although computer
programs are arguably "original works of authorship fixed in a tan-
gible medium," 9 1 the traditional copyright exclusion of utilitarian
objects mitigates against their protection under copyright.
The results of early litigation in the area were consistent with
computer software's apparent statutory ill-fit. Early attempts to find
such software patentable were unsuccessful. Gottschalk v. Benson'
92
and Parker v. Flook'93 are the leading early cases concerning com-
puter software patentability. In Benson, the Supreme Court held a
program to convert binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary
was merely a mathematic calculation, not a patentable process. In
Flook, the Court held a program designed to recalculate alarm lim-
its during the catalytic conversion process of oil refining was not pat-
entable. The only novel feature of the process was the mathematical
formula and, consistent with Benson, a mathematical formula is not
patentable.
The Court did not finally find a program patentable until 1981 in
Diamond v. Diehr.19' The program in Diehr was used similarly to
that in Flook. Diehr involved a program to aid in the process of
curing synthetic rubber. Temperatures were measured inside the
mold and the computer would recalculate the cure time for the rub-
187. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (Supp. V 1981).
188. Charmasson, supra note 134, at 19.
189. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
190. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
191. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. V 1981).
192. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
193. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
194. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
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ber and ultimately would signal a device to open the press at the
correct moment.
Apparently, this last step distinguished Diehr from Flook. Indeed,
commentators asserted, "Flook cannot be reconciled with Diehr on
any but superficial grounds." 195
Similar to the patentability confusion, the area of copyrightability
of computer programs also shows conflict and confusion as various
courts have held for and against copyrightability. 196 Similar conflict
and confusion exists as to copyrightability of video games.197
Unity of Informational Interests: The Public Access/Exclusive
Rights Dilemma Described and Possibly Solved
The confusion and flux around the protectability of computer
software is not surprising. Such confusion will always be the likely
result of trying to fit new technological forms into places within the
pre-existing law. Further, both the conflicts involving computer pro-
gram protectability and the narrow construction of the right of pub-
licity are manifestations of the tension as information entitlements
emerge from the existing jurisprudence.
The tensions are likely to inspire new forms of entitlements. A
commentator recently asserted:
The needs of software writers to be secure in their intellectual property; the
needs of developing technology to reward invention and to reap the benefits
of creativity operating under incentive; and the needs of society to avoid
rigid and lengthy monopolies summon a fresh approach.
A new form of license for computer software, of brief duration, procured
through adversarial procedure, armed with a presumption of validity, and
195. Myrick & Sprowl, Patent Law for Programmed Computers and Programmed
Life Forms, 68 A.B.A. J. 920, 923 (1982).
196. Compare Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240
(3rd Cir. 1983) and Apple Computer, Inc., v. Formula Int'l Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775
(1983) and Tandy Corporation v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171
(N.D. Cal. 1981) (explicit holdings that computer object code programs are copyright-
able) with Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. J.S. & A. Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D.
Ill. 1979), affld on other grounds, 638 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that object
code programs are not copyrightable).
197. Compare Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Arctic International, Inc., 685 F.2d
870 (3rd Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, slip op. at 27-30, 219 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) (N.D. Ill. June 1, 1983); Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F.
Supp. 173 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Stern Electronics Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855-56
(2d Cir. 1982) (cases finding for copyrightability of video games) with Data General
Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 490 F. Supp. 1089, 1113 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Data General
Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 529 F. Supp. 801, 816 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Sunercom Technol-
ogy, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 62 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978); and Data
Cash Systems, Inc. v. J.S. & A. Group, Inc. 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (cases
finding against the copyrightability of video games).
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subject to liberal disclosure and royalty provisions, awaits Congressional
action. 108
The writer mentions three values, the balancing of which have
concerned legal theoreticians continually in the field of intellectual
property. Those concerns are (1) rewarding the creator for innova-
tion; (2) benefiting society by inspiring innovation; and (3) allowing
access of the public to the creative work. The Copyright Clause of
the Constitution 9 itself contains reference to these three values.
If balancing these three values has always been problematical, the
importance of such balancing in a period where information is the
central resource will logically be much greater. In the Information
Age, access to the central resource will, as with all past age's central
resources, be of critical importance, but likewise, entitlements to in-
formation, particularly those producing compensation that can help
the participant meet his fundamental needs, will also be critically
important. The jurisprudence of the Information Age, therefore, is
apt to continually bring into conflict this society's ongoing values of
free access to information and our notions of the sanctity of private
property, specifically as those notions relate to intellectual property.
These conflicts may have existed, in some form, for a long time as a
relatively minor subunit of Anglo-American jurisprudence, but they
will take primacy in the Information Age.
The importance of such inevitable conflicts between long held val-
ues is only perceivable when information interests are perceived ho-
listically.200 A holistic approach to the conflicts often also produces a
solution which, with modifications, can serve as a model for resolu-
tion of various components of the multi-faceted conflict.
This paradigm was basically true for the "new property"201 holis-
tic approach. The guarantees of procedural appeals from the termi-
nation of government entitlements derived from the holistic ap-
proach, were apparently perceived as valuable rights by holders of
the "new property" in many various contexts.
And so it may well be with informational entitlements. A possible
solution to the conflict between the free access/private property val-
ues is systems of compulsory licensing to accompany the systems of
entitlements. Such systems are already in place for some informa-
tional entitlements. Systems are already provided for under the Cop-
198. Reznick, Synercom Tecnology, Inc. v. University Computing Co.: Copyright
Protection for Computer Formats and the Ideal Expression Dichotomy, 8 J. COMPUTER
TECH. & L. 65, 84 (1980).
199. U.S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have power... To pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
200. See supra notes 150-153 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 140-145 and accompanying text.
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yright Act202 for "non-dramatic musical works" 203 and for retrans-
mission of copyrighted material by cable television systems.2 0 4 Under
a compulsory licensing system, when a creator arranges for an enti-
tlement (copyright, patent or some yet-to-be-devised system of enti-
tlement), she will receive the right to use the entitlement herself and
the right to receive compensation whenever anyone else uses it. The
creator will not receive exclusive rights. Therefore, the rest of the
world will have access to that information while the creator is never-
theless rewarded. Thus both this society's free access to information
value and its respect for private property will be satisfied.
Professor Reich20 5 perceived that procedural safeguards against
arbitrary or malicious interference with recipient's rights to govern-
ment largess were often ignored or non-existent. The "due process
revolution"206 that followed was largely a result of judicial reaction
to the "new property" perspective. That revolution applied in many
new situations a legal operation that society had already found use-
ful previously in a small number of situations.
A similar pattern may follow for intellectual entitlements. The
conflict between the free access and private property values is readily
perceived as pervading throughout information entitlement disputes.
As with the widespread solution that the implementation of due pro-
cess procedures represented to the multi-faceted "new property"
problems, compulsory licensing schemes, which are in place in some
informational entitlement contexts, 07 may serve as a widely-used
model. As a holistic new property perspective inspired a procedural
due process revolution, a holistic approach to Information Age enti-
tlements may inspire a compulsory licensing revolution.
CONCLUSION
From the study of past broad socio-economic ages, a model
emerged. A given socio-economic age functions around a central re-
source. For the Feudal Age that central resource was land. For the
Commercial Age that resource was goods to trade and for the Indus-
trial Age, the central resource was the interlocking dual resources of
manufacturing and laboring capacity. For the present-day Informa-
202. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. V 1981).
203. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (Supp. V 1981).
204. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (Supp. V 1981).
205. Reich, supra note 140.
206. See supra notes 146-148 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text.
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tion Age, that central resource is information.
The model further demonstrated that society will create or modify
the jurisprudential system in order to legitimatize the entitlements
which individuals have to the central resource. The feudal society
created a land-based legal system that legitimatized the feudal hier-
archical system and reinforced the relative access each class of peo-
ple had to the resource. The Commercial Age society eventually de-
veloped a law of contract which legitimatized the varying
entitlements resulting from individual bargaining.
The Industrial Age had a dual-faceted central resource. Manufac-
turing capacity could not be utilized without laborers to run the ma-
chines and labor capacity could not work without machines to oper-
ate. The dual nature of the central resource produced a doctrinal
tug-of-war as the jurisprudence of the age struggled between an indi-
vidualistic/bargaining approach and a class/status approach. The in-
dividualistic thrust grew out of an emphasis on industrial develop-
ment arising from the first aspect of the central resource and tended
to be favored by industrial interests. Meanwhile, the working class,
those possessing the second aspect of the central resource, wished to
be dealt with as a group.
This Comment has observed that as history moves from one socio-
economic age to another, there is often a jurisprudence lag. Manifes-
tations of this include the fact that the jurisprudential changes that
best exemplified each age occurred toward the end of it.
20 8
The Information Age will demand other changes in jurisprudential
thinking. Finding models to resolve equitably the longtime conflict
between society's valuing of free access to information while also val-
uing private property rights to information will become more critical
as information becomes the age's central resource. Means to com-
pensate individuals for information activities will have to be devel-
oped. A likely model will be the compulsory licensing model similar
to that used by the Copyright Act.
Looking into the future is difficult. To assist, it is wise to look to
the past. Such a search for assistance from the past has been the
approach of this Comment. No one knows exactly of what the juris-
prudence of the Information Age will consist. But, if history teaches
anything, change in the common law to accommodate the switch in
208. As discussed throughout this Comment, a sophisticated law of real property
did not occur until the late stages of feudalism. The development of contract law did not
occur until the eighteenth or nineteenth century, whereas the Commercial Age that in-
spired its creation began around the turn of the sixteenth century. Full rights to organize
the industrial laboring classes did not occur until the Wagner Act was passed in 1937
though the Industrial Revolution began in earnest after the Civil War about 70 years
earlier.
1110
[VOL. 21: 1077, 1984] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
socio-economic ages will be as multi-faceted and profound as it is
inevitable.
GARY G. KLUECK
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